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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3)0), and was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant/plaintiff Larry Briggs ("Mr. Briggs") presents nine issues for review: 
1. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that appellees/defendants Lowell Brown 
("Mr. Brown") and Valley Spa I, Inc. ("Valley Spa") accepted Mr. Briggs9 
settlement offer. 
The Court of Appeals "review[s] the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, 
granting no deference," and "view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 
the light most fevorable to the nonmoving party." Alder v. Baver Corp.. 461 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 
14 f 20 (Utah November 26,2002). 
2. Whether the trial court incorrectly resolved genuine disputes of feet material to 
whether or not Mr. Brown and Valley Spa accepted Mr. Briggs' settlement offer. 
Review "for correctness... view[ing] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most fevorable to the nonmoving party." Alder v. Baver Corp.. 461 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 11,14f20. 
3. Whether the trial court ruled that Mr. Briggs had no rights whatsoever, neither 
under his original claim, nor under the parties' Settlement Agreement. 
Review "for correctness... viewpng] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Alder v. Baver Corp.. 461 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 11,14f20. 
4. Whether the trial court ruled that the parties' Settlement Agreement 
1 
extinguished all of Mr. Briggs' claims. 
Review "for correctness... viewfing] the fects and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Alder v. Baver Corp,, 461 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 11, 14f20. 
5. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Mr. Briggs' settlement 
offer was not made under duress. 
Review 'for correctness... viewfing] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Alder v. Baver Corp.. 461 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 11,14f20. 
6. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Mr. Brown and Valley 
Spa did not breach their obligations under the parties' Settlement 
Agreement. 
Review "for correctness... viewfing] the fects and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Alder v. Baver Corp., 461 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 11,14f20. 
7. Whether the trial court incorrectly resolved genuine disputes of feet 
material to Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's Counterclaim for 
attorney's fees. 
The legal conclusion that Mr. Briggs' claims were without merit is reviewed "for 
correctness . . . viewfing] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Alder v. Baver Corp., 461 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,14 f 20. The 
factual finding that Mr. Briggs asserted his claims in bad faith is reviewed 4Cunder a clearly 
erroneous standard." In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 491 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 f 45 (Utah January 
16, 2004). To challenge this factual ruling, Mr. Briggs is required to '"marshal the evidence... 
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[and] demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the challenged finding." Rohan v. Bosemaa, 46 P.3d 753, 759-
760 (Utah App. 2002). 
8- Whether the trial court correctly awarded attorney's fees to Mr. 
Brown and Valley Spa pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
The legal conclusion that Mr. Briggs' claims were without merit is reviewed "for 
correctness... viewpng] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Alder v. Baver Corp., 461 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,14 f 20. The 
factual finding that Mr. Briggs asserted his claims in bad faith is reviewed "under a clearly 
erroneous standard." In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 491 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 f 45 (Utah January 
16, 2004). To challenge this factual ruling, Mr. Briggs is required to "marshal the evidence . . . 
[and] demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the challenged finding." Rohan v. Bosemaa 46 P.3d 753, 759-
760 (Utah App. 2002). 
9. Whether the trial court correctly exercised its equity powers to 
award attorney's fees in the interest of justice. 
The factual finding that Mr. Briggs asserted his claims in bad faith is reviewed "under a 
clearly erroneous standard." In re Discipline of Sonnenreichu 491 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 f 45 (Utah 
January 16,2004). To challenge this factual ruling, Mr. Briggs is required to "marshal the 
evidence... [and] demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial 
court, the evidence is insufficient to support the challenged finding." Rohan v. Bosemaa 46 P.3d 
753, 759-760 (Utah App. 2002). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY LAW 
Utah Code Ann § 78-27-56(1): 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good feith. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Mr. Briggs entered into a contract with Valley Spa for the purchase of a Cal Spas 
hot tub and gazebo. Mr. Briggs finished paying the purchase price of $8,939.19 on September 
16,1995. (R. at 172-73.) 
2. For the next four years, Mr. Briggs made no attempt to contact Valley Spa, either 
to request delivery of a hot tub and spa, or to request a refund. (R. at 173.) 
3. Mr. Briggs contacted Valley Spa in September of 1999, because he had heard that 
Valley Spa no longer regularly carried Cal Spas spas and gazebos. (Briggs9 Br. at 12 f 3.) 
4. A dispute arose between Mr. Briggs and Valley Spa about how to satisfy Mr. 
Briggs9 contract. (R. at 173.) 
5. Mr. Briggs formulated a settlement offer 'that we could both live with," and 
communicated it to Mr. Brown and Valley Spa, first in a telephone conversation on November 4, 
1999, and then in a written letter dated November 9,1999 (the "November 9 settlement offer"). 
(R. at 489; Briggs9 Addendum Tab 2.) 
6. Mr. Brown and Valley Spa orally accepted the November 9 settlement offer in a 
telephone conversation with Mr. Briggs on November 11,1999. (R. at 489.) 
7. Mr. Brown and Valley Spa repeated their acceptance in writing in a letter dated 
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November 11,1999 (the '^ November 11 acceptance"). (Briggs5 Addendum Tab 3.) 
8. Valley Spa began performing its obligations under the Settlement Agreement by 
ordering the gazebo specified therein. (R. at 181.) 
9. Mr. Briggs filed this law suit on November 29,1999. (R. at 1.) 
10. Although Mr. Briggs' contract with Valley Spa was worth only $8,939.19, he 
asserted a damages claim of $70,000 plus his attorney's fees and costs of court.55 (R. at 11.) Mr. 
Briggs knew that there was no plausible basis for this inflated damages claim. (R. at 418 f 7.) 
11. Although Mr. Briggs5 contract was with Valley Spa, and not with Mr. Brown 
personally, he asserted his $70,000 damages claim against Mr. Brown personally. Mr. Briggs 
knew that there was no plausible basis for this personal claim against Mr. Brown. (R. at 418-19 % 
8; 541 f 4; 659 f 80 
12. Although Mr. Briggs subsequently reduced his damages claim to $12,000, he 
continued to demand $15,000 to settle - $6,000 more than he had paid Valley Spa, and $3,000 
more than his restated damages claim. (R. at 428 f 56.) 
13. Mr. Briggs knew that his claim against Valley Spa had been settled. (R* at 489; 
Briggs' Addendum, Tabs 2 & 3.) 
14. When the gazebo that Valley Spa had purchased for him arrived, Mr. Brown and 
Valley Spa invited Mr. Briggs to inspect it to satisfy himself that it was in feet the correct gazebo. 
Mr. Briggs never did so; nor did Mr. Briggs take any other discovery regarding the gazebo. (R. 
at 163.) 
15. Mr. Briggs made repeated misrepresentations of feet to the trial court. (R. at 419 
T( 9-12; 420-21 J{ 17-19; 422 ff 23-24; 4261ft[ 40-43; 428 f 54a; 429 f| 59-60; 431 f 70; 432 fl 
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73,76; 433 f 78; 434-35ff 79-82; 541 f 5; 542-43 ff7-11; 549-550 ff 23-26; 553-54 ff 35-38; 
659f12; 660-63 Iff 17-19; 664-665 ff 40-42,43; 668 ff 78-79.) 
16. Mr. Briggs repeatedly made frivolous legal arguments to the trial court. (R. at 
431-33 ff 71-72,74, 76-77.) 
17. Mr. Briggs was pointlessly intransigent on numerous occasions. (R. at 425 f 39; 
426-27 ff 44-53; 428-29 ff 57-61; 429 f 62; 430-31 ff 66-68, 70; 550-51 ff 27-30; 552 f 32; 
665-66 ff 44-53; 667 f 62.) 
18. On June 11, 2001, the trial court granted Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's first Motion 
for Summary Judgment, ruling that Mr. Brown's November 11 acceptance was an unconditional 
acceptance of Mr. Briggs' November 9 settlement offer, and that the resulting Settlement 
Agreement required the dismissal of Mr. Briggs' claims. (R. at 372-76). 
19. In a Minute Entry dated July 25, 2003, and a Final Judgment entered on August 
29,2003, the trial court granted Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's second Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which dealt with their Counterclaim for attorney's fees. The trial court found that Mr. 
Briggs "knowingly and improperly asserted claims which he had previously agreed to settle," and 
that Mr. Briggs' claims were "without merit, and were not asserted in good faith." Ruling both 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-57 and under its inherent equity powers, the trial court ruled that 
Mr. Brown and Valley Spa were entitled to recover the $26,062.50 in attorney's fees they had 
been forced to incur, offset by the $8,939.19 in value that Mr. Briggs was to have received under 
the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 865-69, 884-86.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Briggs did not make his settlement offer under duress. There is no evidence of any 
improper threat, nor is there evidence that he was ever left without any reasonable alternatives. 
Mr. Brown and Valley Spa accepted Mr. Briggs9 settlement offer, first orally in a 
telephone conversation on November 11,1999, and then in a letter written the same day. 
There were no genuinely disputed issues material to the question of whether the settlement 
offer was accepted, and the trial court therefore correctly granted summary judgment enforcing 
the Settlement Agreement. 
The trial court did not in feet extinguish all of Mr. Briggs' rights under both the 
Settlement Agreement and under the parties' underlying contract. 
Mr. Briggs had no "other claims" that were not resolved by the Settlement Agreement. 
Mr. Brown and Valley Spa did not breach the settlement agreement. Rather, Mr. Briggs' 
breach of that agreement relieved them of any further duty to perform thereunder. 
Mr. Briggs tails to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding that he acted 
in bad feith. There are no genuine disputes of feet material to that issue, and much less did the 
trial court commit any clear error. 
The trial court's judgment awarding legal fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 is legally 
sufficient. 
The trial court appropriately exercised its equitable powers as an independent basis on 
which to award attorney's fees. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT MR. BRIGGS DID 
NOT OFFER TO SETTLE UNDER DURESS1 
On pages 30-32 of his brie£ Mr. Briggs argues that he made his settlement offer under 
"duress. "2 Duress requires "[1] an improper threat by another party [2] that leaves the victim no 
reasonable alternative," Andreini v. Hultgrea 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175(1)), and must be proven by "clear and convincing 
evidence." In re Adoption of B.T.D.. 68 P.3d 1021,1026 (Utah App. 2003). Far from "clear 
and convincing" evidence, here there is no record evidence of either element of duress. 
A. There Is No Record Evidence of Any Improper Threat. 
Although Mr. Briggs does not specifically identify what he contends the "improper threat" 
to have been, he asserts that Mr. Brown and Valley Spa 
insisted that they would not honor their end of the contact... threatened to 
illegally convert [Mr. Briggs9] paid-for spa and gazebo into a virtually unusable 
"store credit"... [and threatened that he would otherwise] get nothing. 
(Briggs9 Br. at 30-32.) Mr. Briggs cites to no record evidence that the store credit was "virtually 
unusable," or that Mr. Briggs was ever told he might "get nothing."3 Nor is there record evidence 
*Mr. Briggs makes his duress argument in the fifth section of his brief. However, because 
the validity of the settlement offer is logically prior to the validity of the acceptance of that offer, 
Mr. Brown and Valley Spa address the question of duress first. 
2Mr. Briggs represents that the issue of duress was presented to the trial court on pages 
188-196 of the Record. (Briggs Br. at 8.) Although Mr. Briggs asserts "duress" in those pages, 
the trial court noted that his argument was "confusing" and failed to "clearly set forth any of the 
elements" of duress. (R. at 373.) 
3Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's search of the record has not revealed any such evidence. In 
his affidavit to the trial court, Mr. Briggs testified that he "felt coerced to settle with Lowell 
Brown on terms that would be acceptable to him, or I would get nothing." (Briggs9 Addendum, 
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that Mr. Brown or Valley Spa "insisted" on breaching the underlying contract, or threatened to 
"convert" a spa and gazebo into store credit. Rather, as Mr. Briggs concedes on page 12 of his 
brie£ Valley Spa was "unable to honor" the underlying contract because it ceased carrying Cal 
Spas products during the four years between 1995 when Mr. Briggs paid the purchase price and 
1999 when he reappeared and sought delivery. 
The only evidence Mr. Briggs presented to the trial court was that Mr. Brown "refused" 
his request for a refund, and "told me that I had to spend my (store credit) on current merchandise 
on current prices." (Briggs' Addendum, Tab 4, fflf 7-9.) Mr. Brown and Valley Spa respectfully 
submit that this cannot be a "wrongful threat" suflficient to show duress. Otherwise, such disputes 
could never be settled: If a merchant ever foiled to grant a customer's request for a full refund, 
but instead reached a compromised settlement agreement, that agreement would always be 
vitiated by "wrongful duress." See State Bank of Southern Utah v. Trov Hvgro Systems. 894 
P.2d 1270, 1275 (Utah App. 1995) ("[t]he mere fact that a contract is entered into under stress or 
pecuniary necessity is insufficient [to constitute duress") (quoting Horgan v. Industrial Design 
Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1982)). 
B. There Is No Record Evidence That Mr. Briggs Lacked Reasonable Alternatives. 
Mr. Briggs also cites no record evidence that offering to settle was his only Reasonable 
alternative." 860 P.2d at 921. Rather, the undisputed record evidence demonstrates that Mr. 
Briggs had - and knew he had - a number of reasonable alternatives. 
First, nothing in the record suggests any urgency in Mr. Briggs' wish to receive a refund. 
To the contrary, it is undisputed that after paying the $8,939.19 purchase price in 1995, he waited 
Tab4,f 9; italics added.) 
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four years before contacting Valley Spa; during these four years he never requested a refund or 
delivery of the gazebo and hot tub. (R. at 417 f2; 533; 658.) Moreover, Mr. Briggs concedes 
that the only reason he finally approached Valley Spa and demanded a refond at the end of these 
four years is that he learned Valley Spa no longer carried Cal Spas products. (Briggs' Br. at 12 f 
3.) This situation seems to have been anticipated by the Restatement drafters: "Since alternative 
sources of funds are ordinarily available, a refiisal to pay money is not duress, absent a showing of 
peculiar necessity." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 cmt b (1981). Here there is no 
record evidence of any such "peculiar necessity59 for a refund. Therefore, one reasonable 
alternative open to Mr. Briggs was to wait and continue negotiating. 
Second, in the settlement offer itself Mr. Briggs represented that he was sending the offer 
pursuant to his counsel's instructions, and threatened to pursue legal action if Mr. Brown did not 
"get back with" him to accept the offer. (Briggs Addendum, Tab 2.) Therefore, a reasonable 
alternative that Mr. Briggs understood (and threatened) was that he "could have sought relief 
from the courts." Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp.. 657 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah 1982).4 
Finally, in his verified interrogatory response, Mr. Briggs described the negotiations 
leading up to his settlement offer. Mr. Briggs clearly understood that he had various alternatives: 
[Mr. Brown's letter to the Better Business Bureau] states that I have a $8,939.19 
credit currently with his store Anyway, with this so called credit in mind and 
with [Mr. Brown] saying in our earlier conversationl [sic] that we both have to 
give a little bit, I thought I would try to come up with a solution to reslovefsic] 
this matter, I didn't want to go to court After thinking about it, I thought that 
I had come up with a solution that both of us could live with to resolve this matter. 
4Cf Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 175 cmt. b (1981) (Even an improper threat to 
commence a legal action "does not usually amount to duress because the victim can assert his 
rights in the threatened action, and this is ordinarily a reasonable alternative to succumbing to the 
threat.") 
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. . . I called Mr. Brown... and gave him my new proposal He rejected this 
oflFer. I told him that I would try to think of another solution that we could both 
live with and call him back I thought I had come up with another solution... 
. I called [Mr. Brown] and proposed to him my new oflFer.... [Mr. Brown] 
responded by saying... Fm not saying I won't except [sic] this oflFer and on the 
other hand Fm not saying I will, however if you'll let me think about it over night 
I'll call you tomorrow morning with my answer. I told him that would be fine 
I hadn't heard from [Mr. Brown] for five days so I decided to send him a certified 
letter stating that if he didn't have this final oflFer settled with me by 11-2-99 that I 
would take him to court to settle it. 
(R. at 489.) The "certified letter" was Mr. Briggs' November 9 settlement oflFer. (Id.) This 
record evidence demonstrates that Mr. Briggs understood that he had reasonable alternatives, and 
that his settlement oflFer was a deliberate compromise of the parties' dispute. Certainly there was 
a dispute - Mr. Brown and Valley Spa were not willing to give Mr. Briggs everything he wanted. 
But the existence of the dispute cannot, in and of itself constitute duress. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
SETTLEMENT OFFER WAS UNCONDITIONALLY ACCEPTED 
On pages 17-21 of his brie£ Mr. Briggs argues that the trial court erred in ruling that Mr. 
Brown and Valley Spa accepted the settlement oflFer. However, an unconditional acceptance is 
shown both by Mr. Briggs' own verified interrogatory response regarding his telephone 
conversation with Mr. Brown on November 11,1999, and by the language of Mr. Brown's 
acceptance letter of the same date. 
A. Mr. Brown Accepted the Settlement OflFer in a Telephone Conversation on November ll.3 
In his interrogatory response, Mr. Briggs stated that after he had mailed his November 9 
settlement oflFer, he had a telephone conversation with Mr. Brown on November 11,1999. 
5The trial court based its judgment on Mr. Brown's November 11 acceptance letter 
discussed in section II.B. below. (R. at 375.) Mr. Brown's oral acceptance in this November 11 
telephone conversation provides an alternative basis for affirming. 
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In this phone call [Mr. Brown] agreed to my final offer and stated that he would 
write me a letter corresponding to this agreement and send it to me for my 
signature of approval to settle this matter. He stated that once he had this signed 
letter back in his possession that he would order the gazebo and immediately send 
me a check in the amount of $2,563.51. 
(R. at 489.) According to Mr. Briggs, Mr. Brown did not say that he "might accept if...," nor 
that he "would accept when " Rather, Mr. Briggs concedes that Mr. Brown simply "agreed 
to" the settlement offer, and stated that he would prepare and send a letter "corresponding to this 
agreement" (Emphasis added.) Mr. Brown and Valley Spa respectfully submit that Mr. Briggs' 
sworn interrogatory response shows an unqualified acceptance of the settlement offer. 
Mr. Brown's acceptance of the settlement offer is not invalidated by what he said 
thereafter. Mr. Brown asked Mr. Briggs to sign and return the letter. That would simply 
acknowledge what was legally implicit in the settlement offer, Le^ , that Mr. Brown's acceptance 
of the offer would create a legally binding Settlement Agreement. See 1 Corbin on Contracts 
(1963) § 87 p. 373 ("The expression in words of that which is already implied in the terms of the 
offer is not a variation therefrom.").6 Moreover, the requested acknowledgment was not a 
condition to Mr. Brown's acceptance; Mr. Brown had "agreed to" the settlement offer, and was 
6See also Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. EIMCO Corp.. 207 P.2d 794, 801 (Utah 1949) 
("Sometimes an acceptor from abundance of caution inserts a condition in his acceptance which 
merely expresses what would be implied in fact or law from the offer. As such a condition 
involves no qualification of the acceptor's assent to the terms of the offer, a contract is not 
precluded.") {quoting 1 Williston on Contracts § 78 (Rev. Ed)); 2 Williston on Contracts § 6:15 at 
122 (4th Ed. 1991) (same); R. J. Daum. Const. Co. v. Child. 247 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah 1952) (an 
acceptance "must unconditionally agree to all the material provisions on the offer, and must not 
add any new material conditions, but all of the provisions of an offer need not be expressly stated 
therein - some may be implied from the surrounding circumstances"); Panhandle Eastern Pipe 
Line Co. v. Smith. 637 P.2d 1020,1023 (Wyo. 1981) ("An offer must be accepted 
unconditionally; but there is, as always, an exception to that rule. An acceptance is still effective 
if the addition only asks for something that would be implied from the offer and is therefore 
immaterial."). 
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bound by the resulting Settlement Agreement whether or not Mr. Briggs signed and returned the 
letter. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §61(1981) ("An acceptance which requests a 
change or addition to the terms of the offer is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance is 
made to depend on an assent to the changed or added terms.").7 As this Court held in 
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems. 866 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1993) (citation 
omitted), "[i]f a written agreement is intended to memorialize an oral contract, a subsequent 
Mure to execute the written document does not nullify the oral contract." 
Likewise, Mr. Brown's acceptance was not qualified or invalidated by his proposal of 
when Valley Spa would perform under the Settlement Agreement. In his settlement offer, Mr. 
Briggs set a November 20 deadline for Mr. Brown to "get back to" him and accept the offer, but 
did not specify when Valley Spa was to deliver the gazebo and pay the refund. (See discussion in 
section II.B.2. below.) In a case such as this where there is no agreement as to the time of 
7See also Chouros v. Evona Inv. Co.. 93 P.2d 450,452 (Utah 1939) (a conditional 
exercise of an option "amounts to a rejection; but it is otherwise where the acceptance is in the 
first instance unconditional, and a mere request is added for a departure from the terms of the 
option as to the time and place of completing the transaction"); Sea-Van Investments Associates 
v. Hamilton. 881 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Wash. 1994) ("an acceptance can also request a modification 
of terms, so long as the additional terms are not conditions of acceptance and the acceptance is 
unequivocal"); Alpha Venture/Vantage v. Creative Cartoru 370 N. W.2d 649, 652 (Minn. App. 
1985) ("requested modifications of the offer will not preclude the formation of a contract where it 
clearly appears that the offer is positively accepted, regardless of whether the requests are 
granted"); Kodiak Island Borough v. Large, 622 P.2d 440,448 (Alaska 1981) ("when the 
acceptance of the offer is initially unconditional, the feet that it is accompanied by a request or a 
direction looking to the performance of the contract does not render the acceptance ineffective 
nor give it the character of a counter-offer so long as it does not limit the contract"); 2 Williston 
on Contracts § 6:15 at 127 (4th ed. 1991) ("when an acceptance was first made in positive terms 
and the offeree in addition demanded some performance to which he would not be entitled under 
a proper interpretation of the agreement... the additional demand, under a proper interpretation 
of the agreement, did not invalidate the acceptance and prevent the formation of a contract, on the 
theory that the acceptance was unconditional, and the demand related to performance following 
acceptance"). 
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performance, courts imply a Reasonableness" term.8 After accepting the settlement offer, 
however, Mr. Brown proposed that Valley Spa would order the gazebo and deliver the refund 
check "immediately" when he received the signed letter back from Mr. Briggs. Mr. Brown's 
acceptance of the settlement offer was not made conditional upon Mr. Briggs' assent to the 
proposed addition of this timing term, and therefore Mr. Brown's acceptance "is not thereby 
invalidated." See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 61.9 
Finally, Mr. Brown's understanding that an enforceable settlement agreement had been 
formed is demonstrated by the undisputed feet that - as stated in Mr. Brown's November 11 
acceptance letter (discussed in section ILB. below) - he did order the gazebo for Mr. Briggs. (R. 
at 181.) See Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems. 866P.2d581, 585 (UtahApp. 1993) 
(offer and acceptance supported by the feet that 'the conduct of the parties indicates that both 
parties believed a settlement agreement had been reached"). Cf. 1 Corbin on Contracts (1963) § 
87 p. 373 ('The acceptance should not be held to be conditional if the offeror himself did not so 
treat it; and after action has been taken in the belief that agreement has been reached, a court 
should not over-weigh minor differences in form.") 
For these reasons, Mr. Briggs' verified interrogatory response shows that Mr. Brown 
made an unqualified, oral acceptance of the settlement offer in the November 11 telephone 
conversation. This oral acceptance provides an alternative basis upon which the judgment of the 
trial court can be affirmed. 
8See Coulter & Smith. Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998) ("if a contract foils 
to specify a time of performance the law implies that is shall be done within a reasonable time 
under the circumstances"). 
9See also authorities cited in footnote 7 above. 
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B. Mr. Brown Accepted the Settlement Offer, at the Very Latest, in His November 11 
Acceptance Letter. 
The trial court ruled that Mr. Brown's '"November 11 letter is an unconditional acceptance 
o f Mr, Briggs' settlement offer. (R. at 375.)10 On pages 17-21 of his brief Mr. Briggs asserts 
that the trial court erred, and that the November 11 letter actually rejected his settlement offer and 
made a counteroffer for settlement on different terms. 
I0Mr. Briggs includes the two letters in the Addendum to his brie£ but quotes only 
snippets of each. The November 9 settlement offer reads in relevant part as follows: 
Again I will reiterate my offer. On Thursday (11-4-99) over the phone I 
told you that I was willing to pay the current high price of $5,995.00 + applicable 
tax for the Gazebo as described in my contract I also stated that after paying 
Valley Spa for the Gazebo that there was a remaining balance on my contract of 
around $2,570.00. Because this amount isn't enough to purchase a spa to my 
satisfaction I told you that you would have to refund this amount back to me. 
Since was had this conversation on Thursday... I made an appointment to 
see a Contract Attorney on Tuesday [H]e told me the first thing that I should 
do is write you this letter before we pursue legal action against Valley Spa.. . . If 
you do not except [sic] my offer as described above we will settle this in court 
If you do not except [sic] this offer and it goes to court, Fm suing for the return of 
the contract price + interest.... 
Mr. Brown you now have until November 20,1999 to get back to me and 
totally resolve this issue. If it is not resolved by this date, we will settle it in court. 
You can contact me by phone at 968-3788. If I am not at home you can 
leave a message, the answering machine is always on. 
(Mr. Briggs' Addendum, Tab 2.) The November 11 acceptance letter reads as follows: 
As per your request I have ordered an Omni Luxury 12X16 green metal 
roof gazebo by Cal Spa. This is the 1999 version of the product purchased on 
September 16,1995. The agreed upon price is stated in my October 21,1999 
letter to you, the Better Business Bureau, and the Utah Division of Consumer 
Protection. 
In addition, Valley Spa has agreed to pay the balance of the contract by 
November 18,1999. Our agreement is as follows: $5995.00 plus tax of $380.60 
totaling $6375.68 will be subtracted from the current in sort credit of $8,939.19. 
The balance of $2,563.51 will be paid to you. If you are in agreement with this 
letter please acknowledge by signing below where provided. Valley Spa will issue 
a check at the same time you provide us with agreement of this letter. 
Thank you for your time and consideration of this proposal. 
(Mr. Briggs'Addendum, Tab 3.) 
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L The November 11 letter expressed unqualified acceptance. 
Although Mr. Briggs argues at length about what Mr. Brown did or did not say in his 
November 11 letter, remarkably Mr. Briggs never sets out the full text of that letter. Mr. Briggs' 
assertion that the November 11 letter was "not an 'unconditional acceptance'" of the settlement 
offer (Briggs' Br. at 21) ignores the following language: 
As per your request I have ordered an Omni Luxury 12X16 green metal roof 
gazebo by Cal Spa The agreed upon price is stated in my October 21,1999 
letter Valley Spa has agreed to pay the balance of the contract Our 
agreement is as follows The balance of $2,563.51 will be paid to you. 
(Briggs' Addendum, Tab 3; italics added.) Mr. Brown and Valley Spa respectiully submit that 
this language constitutes an unconditional acceptance of Mr. Briggs' settlement offer.11 
Mr. Briggs never acknowledges the above-quoted language. Rather, on pages 20-21 of 
his brief he asks the Court to focus only on the last three sentences of the November 11 letter: 
If you are in agreement with this letter please acknowledge by signing below where 
provided. Valley Spa will issue a check at the same time you provide us with 
agreement of this letter. 
Thank you for your time and consideration of this proposal. 
Mr. Briggs argues that this language amounts to a rejection of his settlement offer, and a 
counteroffer to settle "different terms." (Briggs' Br. at 18.) Mr. Briggs' argument would of 
course have merit if the November 11 letter stated that "if you acknowledge this letter, then 
Valley Spa will agree to pay the balance of the contract..." This is not, however, what the letter 
says. Rather, as in the prior telephone conversation between Messrs. Briggs and Brown 
"Indeed, the quoted language refers to the Settlement Agreement as an accomplished fact. 
This makes sense in light of Mr. Briggs' sworn interrogatory response (discussed in the preceding 
section) that Mr. Brown had already "agreed to" the settlement agreement in the prior telephone 
conversation. 
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(discussed in section ILA. above), in his November 11 letter Mr. Brown first accepts the 
settlement offer using the unconditional language quoted above. He then asks Mr. Briggs to 
acknowledge what was legally implicit in the settlement offer itself- that Vailley Spa's acceptance 
of the offer would create a legally binding Settlement Agreement.12 Mr. Brown's acceptance of 
the settlement offer, including his commitment that, "The balance of $2,563.51 will be paid to" 
Mr. Briggs, did not depend upon whether or not Mr. Briggs provided the requested 
acknowledgment. Nor did the acceptance depend upon whether or not Mr. Briggs agreed to the 
proposal regarding when Valley Spa would perform.13 As discussed in section II. A. above in 
connection with Mr. Brown's oral acceptance during the parties' telephone conversation, "An 
acceptance which requests a change or addition to the terms of the offer is not thereby invalidated 
unless the acceptance is made to depend on an assent to the changed or added terms." 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 61 (1981).14 
And finally, as argued above in connection with the oral acceptance, Mr. Brown's 
understanding that an enforceable settlement agreement had been formed is demonstrated by the 
undisputed feet that - as stated in the November 11 acceptance - he did order the specified 
gazebo for Mr. Briggs. (R. at 181.) See Goodmansen. 866 P.2d at 585 (offer and acceptance 
supported by the fact that "the conduct of the parties indicates that both parties believed a 
12See 1 Corbin on Contracts (1963) § 87 p. 373 ("The expression in words of that which is 
already implied in the terms of the offer is not a variation therefrom.") and other authorities cited 
in footnote 6 above. 
13On page 24 of his brie$ Mr. Briggs asserts that the "Brown Response fie., the 
November 11 acceptance] demands Mr. Briggs' acceptance.'5 This assertion lias no basis in the 
actual documents. 
14See also other authorities cited in footnote 7 above. 
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settlement agreement had been reached")- Cf. 1 Corbin on Contracts (1963) § 87 p. 373 ("The 
acceptance should not be held to be conditional if the offeror himself did not so treat it; and after 
action has been taken in the belief that agreement has been reached, a court should not over-
weigh minor diflferences in form.") The gazebo that Mr. Brown ordered was delivered to Valley 
Spa in due course. Despite repeated invitations to inspect the gazebo, Mr. Briggs never did so. 
2. The settlement offer set a time limit for acceptance, not for performance. 
Notwithstanding the language of unqualified language in the November 11 letter, Mr. 
Briggs argues that there was no valid acceptance because his settlement offer 
demanded that Defendants perform by November 20, 1999 The Briggs Offer 
thus called for delivery of the specified gazebo and refund of money by November 
20,1999. 
(Mr. Briggs' Br. at 19.) Mr. Briggs's argument ignores the actual language of his settlement 
offer. At the beginning of his settlement offer he complains of Mr. Brown's "not getting back 
with me stating your position on whether you were willing to except [sic] my last offer." (Mr. 
Briggs' Addendum, Tab 2.) Then, at the close of his settlement offer, Mr. Briggs states, 
Mr. Brown you now have until November 20,1999 to get back with me and 
totally resolve this issue. If it is not resolved by this date, we will settle it in court. 
. . . You can contact me by phone at 968-3788. If I am not at home you can leave 
a message, the answering machine is always on. 
(Id.) Thus, November 20 was the deadline for Mr. Brown to "get back with" Mr. Briggs and 
accept the offer. The settlement offer provided that if Mr. Brown did so this dispute would be 
"totally resolve[d]." The settlement offer even suggested that Mr. Brown could accept the offer 
by telephone or by leaving an acceptance on Mr. Briggs' answering machine. Contrary to the 
argument in Mr. Briggs' brie£ however, his settlement offer did not "demand" that Mr. Brown 
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and Valley Spa complete their performances under the Settlement Agreement by November 20.15 
3. Mr. Brown Agreed to procure the correct model of gazebo. 
Mr. Briggs also argues that the November 11 acceptance letter was defective because Mr. 
Brown stated that he had ordered 
an Omni Luxury 12X16 green metal roof gazebo by Cal Spa. This is the 1999 
version of the product purchased on September 16,1995. 
(Briggs Addendum Tab 3.) Mr. Briggs asserts that this was the wrong gazebo in three respects -
wrong dimensions, wrong roof color, and wrong model year. (Briggs Br. at 19-20.) 
i The original contract between Valley Spa and Mr. Briggs was for an "Omni 
Luxury 12X16" gazebo. 
Mr. Briggs' argument regarding the dimensions of the gazebo contradicts his repeated 
representations to the trial court, and ignores the undisputed record. Mr. Briggs' settlement offer 
said he wanted "the Gazebo as described in" his original contract with Valley Spa. (Briggs 
Addendum Tab 2.) As Mr. Briggs repeatedly represented to the trial court, that original contract 
was for a Cal Spa Omni Luxury 12X16 gazebo.16 Thus, in both his Complaint and his Amended 
15Even if the November 9 settlement offer had been ambiguous regarding what is was that 
had to be done by November 20 (i.e.„ get back to Mr. Briggs to accept, or complete all of Valley 
Spa's performance), any such ambiguity should be resolved against Mr. Briggs. See. Jones, 
Waldo. Holbrook. etc. v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366,1372 (Utah 1996) ("In choosing among the 
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof that meaning is generally 
preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing 
otherwise proceeds.) (Citation omitted.); Coulter v. Smith. Ltd.. 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998) 
('The choice of contract interpretations which avoid invalidating an agreement is favored under 
Utah law."). 
16In his settlement offer, Mr. Briggs stated that he was '"willing to pay the cuirent high 
price of $5,995.00 + applicable tax for the Gazebo as described in my contract." (Briggs 
Addendum Tab 2.) The figure of "$5,990.00" comes from an earlier letter from Mr. Brown 
suggesting that the parties settle for "the exact 12X16 Cal spa Omni luxury metal roof gazebo... 
. This unit [is] currently costing $$5,995.00." (R. 173-74.) 
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Complaint, Mr, Briggs pleaded that he "contract to buy an 'Omni Luxury' gazebo that was 12* by 
16V (R. at 4, 39.) When Mr. Brown and Valley Spa moved for summary judgment regarding 
the Settlement Agreement, and stated as an undisputed material feet that the original contract had 
been for a "Cal Spas Omni Luxury 12X16 gazebo" (R. at 172), Mr. Briggs did not dispute this 
feet. To the contrary, in his memorandum opposing summary judgment, Mr. Briggs confirmed 
that his original contract was for "a product from Cal Spas: Omni Luxury 12' by 16'." (R. at 
196.)17 
Mr. Briggs bases his argument regarding the gazebo's dimensions on the following 
parenthetical notation on the second of the two original contract documents he executed with 
Valley Spa: "(outside dim. 167" x 127")." (Briggs Addendum Tab l18.) Based on this notation, 
Mr. Briggs argues that notwithstanding all of his prior representations to the trial court, his 
original contract was for something other than a "Omni Luxury 12X16" gazebo. (Briggs Br. at 
20.)19 As Mr. Briggs knows, however, and as the undisputed record evidence demonstrates, the 
"12X16" in the model name of the gazebo he contracted for refers to the gazebo's inside 
dimensions. (R. at 309.) Indeed, a document which Mr. Briggs produced in response to 
17See also Mr. Briggs' affidavit referring to the gazebo he was to receive under the 
Settlement Agreement as a "deluxe 12f x 16f gazebo." (R. at 210.) 
18The first of the two original contract documents is partially illegible, but appears to 
describe the gazebo as "12X16 luxury." (R. at 182.) 
19The first time Mr. Briggs raised in the trial court this argument regarding the gazebo's 
outside dimensions appears to have been on February 12,2003 <- over a year and a half after the 
trial court had granted Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's first Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling 
that the Settlement Agreement extinguished Mr. Briggs' claims. (R. at 535, 372-76.) Mr. Briggs 
never asked the trial court for consideration of that judgment; rather, he raised this argument only 
in opposition to Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's second Motion for Summary Judgment, which 
addressed their Counterclaim for attorney's fees. 
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discovery requests and them himself introduced into the record suggests that the outside 
dimensions of the "Omni Luxury 12X16" gazebo are 12T x 16'8'\ (R. 500, 632.) If Mr. Briggs 
had responded to one of the repeated invitations to inspect the gazebo (R. at 521), he could have 
satisfied himself regarding its outside dimensions. But Mr. Briggs took no such discovery. (R. at 
163.) The only competent record evidence is Mr. Brown's testimony that the gazebo which was 
specified in the November 11 acceptance letter, and which was ordered by and delivered to Valley 
Spa, was the gazebo specified by Mr. Briggs' original contract with Valley Spa. (R. at 181.) The 
parenthetical notation regarding the outside dimensions of a "Omni Luxury 12X16" gazebo does 
not contradict this fact. 
ii. The color of the gazebo's roof was immaterial and Mr. Briggs9 right to 
raise this issue was waived bv his delay in doing so. 
Mr. Briggs also argues that the November 11 acceptance letter was invalid because Mr. 
Brown stated therein that he had ordered a gazebo with a "green metal roof." (Briggs Addendum 
Tab 3.) Mr. Briggs argues that this was the wrong color. (Briggs Br. at 19-20.) The settlement 
offer did not specify a roof color, but referred to the parties' original contract. (Briggs 
Addendum Tab 2.) The second of the two documents forming that contract is not terribly legible, 
but does appear to call for a grey roof (Briggs Addendum Tab 1); if so, Mr. Brown may have 
misread that document. However, an acceptance is valid so long as it "assent[s] to all material 
terms presented in the offer." Cal Wadsworth Const, v. City of St. George. 898 P.2d 1372,1376 
(Utah 1995) (emphasis added). The immateriality of the roof color is demonstrated by Mr. 
Briggs' delay of over three years before ever raising this issue. 
Although Messrs. Brown and Briggs had a telephone conversation regarding the gazebo a 
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few days after Mr. Briggs had received the November 11 acceptance letter (R. at 10-11), there is 
no indication in the record that Mr. Briggs raised the issue of the gazebo's roof color. Nor did 
Mr. Briggs mention this issue in his pleadings (R. at 1-13, 34-50), nor even in his opposition to 
Mr Brown and Valley Spa's first Motion for Summary Judgment which sought enforcement of 
the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 188-219.) Instead, the first time Mr. Briggs objected to the 
gazebo's roof color appears to have been February 12,2003 - over three years after he had 
received Mr. Brown's November 11,1999, acceptance letter, and over a year and a half after the 
trial court had ruled that the Settlement Agreement extinguished Mr. Briggs' claims. (R. at 535, 
372-76.) And Mr. Briggs raised the roof color issue not in the context of a motion for 
reconsideration of that first ruling (indeed, Mr. Briggs never asked the trial for such 
reconsideration), but only in opposition to summary judgment on Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's 
Counterclaim for attorney's fees. (R. 535.) And when Mr. Briggs did finally raise this issue 
before the trial court, even he got it wrong. Mr. Briggs first stated to the trial court that the 
parties' original contract "describes a gazebo that is 'grey,'" but then that Mr. Brown and Valley 
Spa "substituted the color grey for green." (R. at 535.) 
Mr. Brown and Valley Spa respectfully submit that Mr. Briggs' delay of over three years 
before he raised the color of the gazebo's roof demonstrates that he considered it an immaterial 
detail20 Mr. Brown and Valley Spa further submit that through his unreasonable delay, Mr. 
Briggs has waived any right to raise this issue, and that the trial court properly disregarded this 
belated argument when Mr. Briggs asserted it in opposition to the second Motion for Summary 
20The roof color might have been quickly and easily switched if Plaintiff had mentioned it 
in a timely manner. 
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Judgment, which dealt with the Counterclaim for attorney's fees. 
iii There is no record evidence of any material difference between the 1999 
and the 1993,1994 or 1995 versions of the Cal Spa Omni Luxury 12X16 
gazebo. 
Finally, Mr. Briggs argues that the November 11 acceptance letter is invalid because it 
refers to the "1999 version" of the gazebo. The parties' original contract does not specify any 
particular model year. Nevertheless, Mr. Briggs9 argument seems to be premised on a speculation 
of feet that the 1999 gazebo is somehow materially different from the gazebo he wanted. Mr. 
Briggs' speculation is only that; as noted above, he never inspected the gazebo. Therefore, the 
only competent record evidence is Mr. Brown's testimony that the gazebo named in the 
November 11 acceptance letter and subsequently delivered to Valley Spa, was the gazebo 
specified in the parties' original contract. (R. at 181.) 
For these reasons, the trial court correctly ruled that Mr. Brown and Valley Spa accepted 
Mr. Briggs' November 9 settlement offer. That acceptance was made orally in the November 11 
telephone conversation between Messrs. Briggs and Brown, and repeated in writing in Mr. 
Brown's November 11 acceptance letter. In either event, there was a binding Settlement 
Agreement. 
in. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
DID NOT INVOLVE ANY GENUINE DISPUTES OF FACT 
On page 22 of his brief, Mr. Briggs appears to argue that as a matter of law, the question 
of whether an offer has been accepted is always a genuine dispute of feet that can never be 
decided on summary judgment. Therefore, argues Mr. Briggs, the trial court necessarily erred 
when it granted Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's first Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling that they 
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had accepted the settlement offer. If this were the law, summary judgment would never be 
available in contract actions unless all parties stipulated to acceptance. The case Mr. Briggs cites 
for this rule - Cal Wadsworth. 898 P.2d at 1378 - does not so hold. The question in Cal 
Wadsworth was whether an offer had been accepted orally; there was conflicting testimony 
about whether the offeree had in feet said that he accepted the offer. 898 P.2d at 1378. Given 
such a factual dispute, it is certainly correct that "[a] trial court's finding about whether a party 
accepted an offer or a counteroffer is a finding of feet." Id. However, when there is no such 
"material dispute of feet, the existence of a contract is a conclusion of law." Reedeker v. 
Salisbury. 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah App. 1998). 
On pages 22-24 of his brief, Mr. Briggs asserts that there were genuine factual disputes 
that were material to the issue of acceptance, and that the trial court therefore erred when it 
granted Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's first Motion for Summary Judgment. Mr. Briggs does not, 
however, identify any such factual disputes. Unlike the situation in Cal Wadsworth where the 
parties disputed what had been said, in the instant case the acceptance is both established by Mr. 
Briggs' own verified interrogatory response (section II.A. above), and embodied in a written 
document (section II.B. above). There is therefore no factual dispute about what words were 
used. The only potential ambiguity in the two documents is whether the gazebo which Mr. Briggs 
referred to in his November 9 settlement offer is materially different from the gazebo Mr. Brown 
referred to in his November 11 acceptance. As discussed at length in the preceding section, the 
undisputed record evidence establishes that there is no such material difference.21 
21Moreover, as noted in the preceding section, the supposed differences which Mr. Briggs 
argues to this Court - dimensions, color, and model year - were never presented to the trial court 
in opposition to Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's first Motion for Summary Judgment. Instead, Mr. 
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Thus, contrary to Mr. Briggs9 argument, there are no facts material to the question of 
acceptance that were ever materially disputed. The trial court correctly ruled that the language of 
Mr, Brown's November 11 letter manifested an unconditional acceptance of the settlement offer. 
(See discussion in section II.B. above.) The unconditional acceptance of the settlement offer is 
also shown by Mr. Briggs' interrogatory response regarding his November 11 telephone 
conversation with Mr. Brown. (See discussion in section II.A. above.) 
IV, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXTINGUISH ALL OF MR. BRIGGS' 
RIGHTS UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
On pages 24-26 of his brie£ Mr. Briggs argues that the trial court extinguished all of his 
rights under both the parties' underlying contract and their subsequent Settlement Agreement, 
thereby leaving Mr. Briggs "stripped naked at the bar of justice." (Briggs Br. at 26.)22 Mr. 
Briggs9 misrepresents the trial court's ruling. 
The trial court ruled that Mr. Brown and Valley Spas' November 11 acceptance of Mr. 
Briggs' November 9 settlement offer created a binding Settlement Agreement that "totally 
resolve[d]" the parties' dispute, and required the dismissal of Mr. Briggs' attempt to assert the 
settled claims. (R. at 372-375.) The trial court also ruled that it was Mr. Briggs who breached 
the parties' Settlement Agreement when he filed his $70,000 Complaint on November 29,1999, 
and that Mr. Briggs' breach "relieved [Mr. Brown and Valley Spa] of any duty they had to 
Briggs raised them over a year and a half after the trial court had granted that motion, and only in 
opposition to Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's second Motion for Summary Judgment, which dealt 
with their Counterclaim for attorney's fees. (R. 535.) 
22Mr. Briggs does not include this argument in his Statement of Issues Presented For 
Review, and does not indicate if it was preserved below. Mr. Brown and Valley Spa have been 
unable to locate any mention of this argument in the record. 
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perform under the [Settlement] Agreement." (R. at 867.)23 Finally, the trial court ruled that 
because of the bad-faith nature of Mr. Briggs' claims, and his many wrongful litigation tactics 
documented in Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's memoranda, Mr. Briggs was would be required to 
reimburse the $26,062.50 in attorneys' fees he had wrongfully forced Mr. Brown and Valley Spa 
to incur; the trial court based this judgment on both Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, and on the 
court's general equity powers. (R. at 866, 885; see discussion in sections VIII-IX below.) 
If, as Mr. Briggs represents, the trial court had simply extinguished all of his rights under 
the Settlement Agreement, the trial court would have entered judgment for Mr. Brown and Valley 
Spa in the amount of $26,062.50 - their entire attorney's fees. The trial court did not do so. 
Rather, the trial court imposed an oflset in the amount of'the $8,939.19 in cash and value that 
[Mr. Briggs] was to receive under the parties' settlement agreement," and entered judgment in the 
amount of $17,123.31. (R. at 886.) Therefore, although Mr. Briggs was held responsible for the 
attorney's fees he had wrongfully forced Mr. Brown and Valley Spa to incur, he was also given all 
of the benefit he was to receive under the Settlement Agreement. 
V. THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TOTALLY RESOLVED MR-
BRIGGS'UNDERLYING CLAIMS 
On pages 26-30 of his brief, Mr. Briggs argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his 
"other claims."24 Mr. Briggs implies that the parties' Settlement Agreement was somehow limited 
23Mr. Briggs quoted this part of the trial court's ruling on page 26 of his brief. Yet on the 
preceding pages 24 and 25 he simply ignores this, and asserts that it was Mr. Brown and Valley 
Spa who breached the Settlement Agreement, and that he therefore had an election of remedies. 
24The only record citation given by Mr. Briggs to demonstrate that his argument was 
preserved before the trial court is his Amended Complaint - R. at 34-50. (Briggs Br. 7.) The 
Amended Complaint does not suggest any theory by which "other claims" could have survived the 
Settlement Agreement. Nor have Mr. Brown and Valley Spa been able to find anywhere else in 
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in scope - that some "other claims" were carved out from it. There was, however, no such 
"carve-out" in Mr. Briggs' November 9 settlement offer. To the contrary, he offered to "totally 
resolve" his underlying dispute, (Briggs Addendum Tab 2.) Therefore, Mr. Briggs has no "other 
claims" that survived the Settlement Agreement. 
VI. MR. BROWN AND VALLEY SPA DID NOT BREACH THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
On page 33 of his brie£ Mr. Briggs refers to the trial court's holding that Mr. Briggs 
"breached the Settlement Agreement" on November 29,1999, when he filed his $70,000 
Complaint, and that this breach by Mr. Briggs "relieved [Mr. Brown and Valley Spa] of any duty 
they had to perform under the Agreement.". (R. at 867.) Mr. Briggs asserts that Mr. Brown and 
Valley Spa have "admitted" committing a prior breach of the Settlement Agreement, and that the 
trial court's judgment is therefore in error. (Briggs' Br. at 33.) 
Mr. Briggs' argument relies on a statement by Mr. Brown and Valley Spa in March of 
2003 - long after Mr. Briggs had breached the Settlement Agreement. Mr. Briggs had argued to 
the trial court that Mr. Brown and Valley Spa were still legally required to perform all of their 
obligations under the Settlement Agreement (R. at 685-688) - despite the facts that Mr. Briggs 
had first breached the agreement over three years before, still refused to acknowledge the 
existence of the agreement, and had wrongfully forced Mr. Brown and Valley Spa to incur over 
$20,000 in legal fees. Mr. Briggs and Valley Spa replied that 
[Mr. Briggs] breached the Settlement Agreement by filing this law suit; that 
breached relieved [Mr. Brown and Valley Spa] of any duty to continue performing 
under the Settlement Agreement.... Moreover, because [Mr. Briggs] refuses to 
acknowledge the existence of the Settlement Agreement, it would be foolhardy for 
the record where Mr. Briggs preserved this argument below. 
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[Mr. Brown and Valley Spa] to perform thereunder: [Mr. Briggs] would only 
retain the benefits of that performance, and argue that he still had claims against 
[Mr. Brown and Valley Spa]. 
(R. at 693.) The statement upon which Mr. Briggs purports to rely in no way contradicts the feet 
it was he who first breached the Settlement Agreement; he did so when he ignored that 
agreement, and filed his unfounded $70,000 complaint against Mr. Brown personally and against 
Valley Spa. 
VII. THERE WERE NO GENUINE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTERCLAIM 
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Mr. Brown and Valley Spa counterclaimed for the $26,062.50 in legal costs Mr. Briggs 
had forced them to incur by his bad-faith assertion of baseless claims, and by the wrongful 
litigation practices he employed. Mr. Brown and Valley Spa moved for summary judgment on 
this Counterclaim in their second Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 415.) Their 
memorandum in support of that motion chronicled Mr. Briggs' wrongful conduct in 87 
paragraphs of "undisputed material facts." (R. at 417-436.) 
On page 34 of his brief, Mr. Briggs refers to the fact that in his memorandum in 
opposition to the second Motion for Summary Judgment, he purported to dispute 33 of those 87 
paragraphs. (R. at 533-544.) Mr. Briggs argues that therefore the trial court could not properly 
grant summary judgment. 
However, as Mr. Brown and Valley Spa demonstrated in their reply memorandum in 
support of the second Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 655-669), Mr. Briggs raised genuine 
disputes as to only six of the 87 paragraphs of'"undisputed material facts." Mr. Briggs' non-
genuine disputes of 27 of the paragraphs do not preclude summary judgment. See Utah Rule of 
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Civil Procedure 56(c) (summary judgment "shall be rendered" when the record shows "no 
genuine issue as to any material feet") (emphasis added).25 Mr. Briggs9 pattern of wrongful 
conduct shown in the 81 undisputed paragraphs supports the trial court's award of summary 
judgment on the Counterclaim. Therefore, although Mr. Briggs raised genuine disputes as to the 
particular instances of his misconduct described in six of the 87 paragraphs, those disputes are 
immaterial within the meaning of Rule 56. See Kesler v. Kesler, 583 P.2d 87, 89 n.l (Utah 1978) 
("Where some of the facts are in dispute, summary judgment can properly be rendered against a 
defendant if, on the undisputed facts, he has no valid defense.") 
A. Mr. Briggs Fails to Marshal Evidence in Support of the Trial Court's Finding That He 
Asserted His Claims in Bad Faith. 
The trial court based its grant of summary judgment on the Counterclaim on two separate 
legal theories: (1) Utah's "bad feith" litigation statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56, and (2) the 
court's inherent equitable powers to award attorney's fees where a party has acted in bad faith." 
(R. at 885.) Under each of these legal theories, the trial court made a finding of fact that Mr. 
Briggs' claims "were not asserted in good faith." (Id.)26 In order to challenge the trial court's 
finding, Mr. Briggs 'Svas required to marshal the evidence, citing the appellate court to all the 
evidence supporting [the] trial court's ruling... [and] demonstrate why, even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is insufficient to support the challenged 
25See also Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillmaa 619 P.2d 1390,1391 (Utah 1980) (summary 
judgment is not precluded "simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a 
material feet is genuinely controverted") (italics added). 
26See In re Discipline of Sonnenreich. 491 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 f 45 (Utah January 16, 
2004) ("Whether a claim has 'not [been] brought or asserted in good faith' [under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56] is a question of fact and we review it under a clearly erroneous standard."). 
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finding." Rohan v. Boseman, 46 P.3d 753, 759-760 (Utah App. 2002) (internal citations 
omitted.)27 Mr. Briggs attempts no such marshaling. 
B. Mr. Brown Did Not Genuinely Dispute 81 of the 87 Paragraphs of'^ Undisputed Material 
Facts" in Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's Summary Judgment Memorandum. 
Mr. Briggs does not even claim to have disputed the majority of the 87 paragraphs of 
'"undisputed material facts." These concededly undisputed paragraphs establish a large portion of 
Mr. Briggs' wrongful litigation conduct. Thus, there was no dispute (genuine or otherwise) that 
although Mr. Briggs paid Valley Spa only $8,939.19, he initially asserted a baseless damages 
claim of $70,000 (R. at 418 f 7), and that although he subsequently reduced his damages claim to 
$12,000, he continued to demand $15,000 to settle. (R. at 428 ff 55-56.) Nor did Mr. Briggs 
dispute that although his pleadings quoted at length from a telephone conversation he had with 
Mr. Brown on November 15, 1999, he subsequently denied having any recording of that 
conversation. (R. at 419 Yl 9-1228.) Nor did Mr. Briggs dispute facts that establish that he made 
additional fectual misrepresentations to the trial court (R. at 422 ff 23-24; 428154a; 429 flf 59-
60; 431170; 432 ff 73, 76; 434-35^180-82), made frivolous legal arguments (R, at 431-33 ft 
71-72, 74, 76-77), and was pointlessly intransigent. (R. at 426-27 ff 44-47, 50, 52; 428-29 fflf 
57-61; 430-31 ff 66-68, 70.) Finally, Mr. Briggs did not dispute the amount and reasonableness 
of the legal fees Mr. Brown and Valley Spa had been forced to incur; he simply asserted to the 
trial court that those paragraphs of "undisputed material facts" "should be stricken." (R. at 554 f 
27See also Wardlev Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon. 61 P.3d 1009,1014 (Utah 
2002) ("To mount a successful challenge to a trial court's findings of feet, an appellant must 
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's findings.") 
28Although Mr. Briggs claims to have disputed paragraphs 12 and 23 of the "undisputed 
material facts," he actually responded to only a portion of eack (R. at 541 f 5, 544 f 13 .) 
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38.) 
Mr. Brown and Valley Spa need not, however, rely on the facts in these admittedly 
undisputed paragraphs. The disputes Mr. Briggs purports to have raised to an additional 27 of 
the paragraphs are not "genuine" within the meaning of Rule 56(c). In his attempt to show 
disputes of feet, Mr. Briggs relied heavily on his own affidavits, all of which, however, are based 
only on his "personal knowledge and belief." (R. at 561, 563, 590; Briggs Addendum, Tab 4.) 
These affidavits were incompetent under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e),29 and cannot raise a 
genuine dispute of feet. Treloggan v. Treloggan. 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) ("an affidavit on 
information and belief is insufficient to provoke a genuine issue of feet"). 
Many of Mr. Briggs9 purported responses to the additional 27 paragraphs of "undisputed 
material fects" are simply inapposite. For example, in paragraph 9-12 of their "undisputed 
material fects," Mr. Brown and Valley Spa referred to the extended quotations Mr. Briggs 
included in his pleadings. (R. at 419 ff 9-12.) These quotations are allegedly of a telephone 
conversation between Messrs. Brown and Briggs on November 15, 1999. (R. at 419 f 9.) 
Nevertheless, when Mr. Brown and Valley Spa asked for any recording or other documentation 
from which Mr. Briggs had taken those quotations, he denied that any such recording or 
documentation had ever existed. (R at 419^11-12.) In paragraph 12, Mr. Brown and Valley 
Spa stated that, 
If this is so, [Mr. Briggs] simply fabricated the purported quotations in his 
Complaint and Amended Complaint. 
29
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Id. 
31 
(R. at 419 f 12.) Mr. Briggs purported to dispute this as follows: 
This should be stricken because it is a legal conclusion. Furthermore, it relies on 
the logical error that there are only two possible explanations. [Mr. Brown and 
Valley Spa] offer no evidence that purports to establish that [Mr. Briggs] 
fabricated what was in quotes. 
(R. at 541 % 5.)30 As Mr. Brown and Valley Spa noted in their reply memorandum to the trial 
court, 
[Mr. Briggs] correctly notes that the fact that he "fabricated the purported 
quotations in his Complaint and Amended Complaint" arises from simple logic: 
Such extended quotations are either based upon some record, or are fabricated. 
Plaintiff denies having any record, so the quotations much have been fabricated. 
[Mr. Briggs] argues that it is "logical error" to assume there are only two possible 
explanations..., but does not suggest a third possibility. 
(R. at 659 f 12.) Mr, Brown and Valley Spa respectfully submit that given Mr. Briggs' repeated 
assertions that he had no recording or other documentation from which he might have drawn the 
alleged quotations, and given his Mure to provide any other explanation, he has not genuinely 
disputed the fact that he must have fabricated those quotations. 
Mr. Briggs made a similarly inapposite response to paragraph 51 of the "undisputed 
material facts." In paragraphs 50-53, Mr. Brown and Valley Spa referred to Mr. Briggs' 
intransigent refusal to stipulate to the authenticity of five documents, despite having previously 
admitted that they were authentic. (R. at 427-28 ff 50-53.) In paragraph 51, Mr. Brown and 
Valley Spa stated that 
[Mr. Briggs] refused to include a stipulation as to these documents' authenticity in 
a Stipulated Discovery Plan. 
30In his further response to paragraph 12, Mr. Briggs mischaracterizes one of the affidavits 
submitted by Mr. Brown and Valley Spa, and once again denies that he had any recording of the 
November 15 telephone conversation. (JjJ.) 
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(R. 427 f 51.) Mr. Brown and Valley Spa attached to their memorandum a copy of the draft 
Stipulated Discovery Plan in which Mr. Briggs had crossed through the proposed stipulation. (R. 
at 505.) Mr. Briggs purported to dispute paragraph 51 by asserting that he objected to a different 
provision in the draft Stipulated Discovery Plan, and asserting that Mr. Brown and Valley Spa 
"know that the documents in question have not been disputed." (R. 551 % 29.) Nevertheless, Mr. 
Briggs did not dispute paragraph 52 which set out his counsel's attempt to justify his refusal to 
stipulate to the documents' authenticity: 
You already have whatever my client has as evidence in you possession. You will 
not get admissions out of me; you must get them out of him - that is the waiy the 
system works. 
(R. at 427 f 52.) Mr. Brown and Valley Spa respectfully submit that Mr. Briggs failed to 
genuinely dispute the fact that he refused to stipulate to the authenticity of these documents. 
Other of Mr. Briggs' responses were not so much logically inapposite as legally frivolous. 
Thus, in paragraph 8 of their "undisputed material facts," Mr. Brown and Valley Spa referred to 
the fact that Mr. Briggs had asserted his inflated $70,000 damages claim not only against Valley 
Spa, but also against Mr. Brown personally. Mr. Brown and Valley Spa stated as an undisputed 
feet that Mr. Briggs had no factual or legal basis for this damages claim against Mr. Brown 
personally. (R. at 418-19 f 8.) Mr. Briggs purported to dispute this paragraph as follows: 
[Mr. Briggs] admits that he named Lowell Brown as a party to the lawsuit. Larry 
Briggs says under oath, "Lowell Brown told me that he made all of the decisions at 
his business and that the business was his. And that he made all the decisions 
regarding my gazebo and hot tub purchase." (Affidavit of Larry Briggs31, Ex-10 
#5). [Mr. Brown and Valley SpaJ's statement should be stricken because of the 
legal conclusion it draws. [Mr. Briggs] does not provide any affidavits or other 
31Mr. Briggs refers to one of his affidavits made on "personal information and belief." (R. 
at 590.) 
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sworn testimony to establish any of the above statements. The Exhibit [Mr. 
Brown and Valley Spa] point to [i.e., the original contract documents] do not 
make it clear who the contract is between. Seven names are listed on the contracts 
that [Mr. Briggs] signed. 
(R. 541 f 4,) As Mr. Brown and Valley Spa pointed out in their reply memorandum to the trial 
court, it was legally fiivolous for Mr. Briggs to argue that the corporate veil could be pierced and 
Mr. Brown held personally liable on a corporate contract simply because he owned and operated 
the corporation's business. (R. at 659 f 8, citing Orlob v. Wasatch Management, 33 P.3d 1078, 
1082 (Utah App. 2001).) Moreover, Mr. Brown and Valley Spa also pointed out that it is "clear 
from the contract documents that Mr. Brown was not personally a party to the contract." (R. at 
659 f 8; Briggs' Addendum, Tab 1; R. at 447-48.) Mr. Briggs' had no basis in fact for his 
assertion to the contrary. Therefore, although Mr. Briggs attempted to show some justification 
for having asserted a $70,000 claim against Mr. Brown personally, the attempted justification was 
legally and factually fiivolous. Mr. Briggs therefore failed to genuinely dispute the feet that his 
claim against Mr. Brown personally was baseless. 
The remainder of Mr. Briggs' purported disputes of feet are discussed at length in the 
reply memorandum which Mr, Brown and Valley Spa filed with the trial court in support of their 
second Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 655-669.) Mr. Brown and Valley Spa respectfully 
submit that there is no genuine dispute as to 81 of their paragraphs of'"undisputed material fects," 
and that the record before the trial court establishes the following fects: 
1. Mr. Briggs knew that his $70,000 damages claim was meritless. (R. at 418 ^  7.) 
2. Mr. Briggs knew that his personal claim against Mr. Brown was meritless. (R. at 
418-19 f 8; 54114; 659 f 8.) 
It must be noted that these first two fects do not depend on the existence of the parties' 
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Settlement Agreement. With or without the Settlement Agreement, Mr. Briggs could not have 
any honest belief in the propriety of these claims. 
3. Even after he reduced his damages claim to $12,000, Mr. Briggs continued to 
demand $15,000 to settle. (R. at 428 ^  56.) 
4. Mr. Briggs knew that his claim against Valley Spa had been settled. (R. at 489; 
Briggs9 Addendum, Tabs 2 & 3.)32 
5. Mr. Briggs made repeated misrepresentations of fact to the trial court. (R. at 419 
IHf 9-12; 420-21 fl 17-19; 422 fl 23-24; 426 fl 40-43; 428 f 54a; 429 1ft[ 59-60; 
431170; 432 fl 73, 76; 433 f 78; 434-35ff 79-82; 541 f 5; 542-43 fl7-l 1; 549-
550 t1f 23-26; 553-54 fl 35-38; 659112; 660-6311(17-19; 664-665 f| 40-42,43; 
668 ff 78-79.) 
6. Mr, Briggs repeatedly made frivolous legal arguments to the trial court. (R. at 
431-33 fflf 71-72, 74, 76-77.) 
7* Mr. Briggs was pointlessly intransigent on numerous occasions. (R. at 425 f 39; 
426-27 f| 44-53; 428-29 fl[ 57-61; 429 f 62; 430-31 ff 66-68, 70; 550-51 Iff 27-
30; 552 f 32; 665-66 f [ 44-53; 667 f 62.) 
8. As a result of Mr. Briggs' assertion of knowingly false claims, and the wrongful 
litigation practices with which he attempted to pursue those claims, Mr. Brown 
and Valley Spa were forced to incur reasonable legal expenses in the amount of 
$17,585.10 at the time they filed their second Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
at 435 f 85), which increased to the total of $26,062.50 at the time the trial court 
entered its final judgment. (R. at 878 f 2.) 
Mr. Brown and Valley Spa respectfully submit that given these undisputed facts, Mr. 
320n page 34 of his brie£ Mr. Briggs refers to the eight pages in his memorandum to the 
trial court opposing the second Motion for Summary Judgment in which he purported to dispute 
the existence of the Settlement Agreement. However, Mr. Briggs' argument to the trial court 
depended on his own incompetent affidavits, the arguments discussed in sections II.B. above, and 
a number of additional arguments he has elected not to pursue on appeal. 
Moreover, when Mr. Briggs made this argument to the trial court in opposition to the 
second Motion for Summary Judgment, he simply ignored the feet that it had already been 
decided. Almost two years earlier, the trial court had ruled that the settlement offer had been 
accepted, and that the resulting Settlement Agreement required the dismissal of Mr. Briggs9 
claims. (R. at 375.) Mr. Briggs never acknowledged that the court had already ruled against him 
on this issue, nor did he ever make a motion for reconsideration of the prior ruling. 
35 
Briggs "has no valid defense" to the Counterclaim. Kesler, 583 R2d at 89 n. 2. Therefore, even 
if other instances of his wrongful conduct might be genuinely debated, this does not show any 
"material" dispute within the meaning of Rule 56. 
C. The Rule 11 Motion Filed Against Mr. Briggs' Counsel Does Not Preclude Summary 
Judgment on the Counterclaim. 
On pages 35-36 of his brie£ Mr. Briggs argues that summary judgment should have been 
precluded by a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions which Mr. Brown and Valley Spa filed against Mr. 
Briggs' counsel. This motion dealt with eight alleged misrepresentations of fact contained in an 
affidavit by Mr. Briggs' counsel and an affidavit by Mr. Briggs. (R. at 700-05.)33 Mr. Briggs had, 
through his counsel, submitted these affidavits to the trial court in opposition to the second 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Mr. Briggs' counsel had opposed the motion on the ground that 
the alleged misrepresentations were not "significant" enough to warrant Rule 11 sanctions. (E.g., 
33Five of the alleged misrepresentations were in a sworn affidavit executed by Mr. Briggs' 
counsel: 
1. that Mr. Brown's counsel agreed to produce him for an "informal meeting" rather 
than a real deposition; 
2. that Mr. Brown was never placed under oath; 
3. that the deposition of Mr. Brown was conducted as an "informal meeting" or 
"interview" rather than as a deposition; 
4. that Mr. Briggs' counsel had never claimed to have a tape recording of the 
telephone conversation purportedly quoted in the Complaint and Amended 
Complaint; and 
5. that Mr. Briggs' counsel never threatened to depose all of Defendants' Utah State 
Fair customers, and to inform each that he or she might have a statutory claim 
against Defendants. 
The remaining three alleged misrepresentations were in Mr. Briggs' affidavit "on knowledge and 
belief: 
6. that Mr. Briggs had no reason to believe that any gazebo had been ordered for 
him; 
7. that Mr. Briggs was never notified by Defendants that the gazebo had arrived; and 
8. that Valley Spa purchased the wrong the gazebo for Mr. Briggs. 
(R. at 756.) 
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R. at 739.) 
Mr. Brown and Valley Spa filed a reply memorandum responding to this "significance'9 
argument as follows: 
[I]f these representations were so inconsequential, one wonders why [Mr. Briggs] 
bothered to make them, or why he didn't withdraw them during the 21-day grace 
period. In reality, [Mr. Briggs and Valley Spa] challenge only those falsehoods 
which are relevant to their Counterclaim. [Mr. Briggs] made these false 
representations in an attempt to raise material disputes of fact precluding summary 
judgment on the Counterclaim. The materiality of each alleged misrepresentation 
is discussed below. 
(R. at 757-58.) Mr. Brown and Valley Spa went on to discuss how each of the eight alleged 
misrepresentations was relevant to the course of misconduct they alleged against Mr. Briggs in 
their Counterclaim, (R. at 758-766.) 
Mr. Briggs argues that because Mr. Brown and Valley Spa used the words "material" and 
"materiality," they have conceded that were not entitled to summary judgment. Mr, Brown and 
Valley Spa respectfully submit that the eight alleged misrepresentations identified in their motion 
for Rule 11 sanctions are certainly "material" in the sense of being relevant to the Counterclaim, 
and in the sense that an attorney should not be able to knowingly misrepresent them with 
impunity. They are not, however, "material" within the meaning of Rule 56 as applied to the 
second Motion for Summary Judgment. As discussed in the preceding section, Mr. Brown and 
Valley Spa were entitled to judgment on their Counterclaim on the basis of the undisputed record. 
Although, but for these alleged misrepresentations, they might have proven even more examples 
of Mr. Briggs' wrongful litigation practices, that does not render these misrepresentations 
"material" disputes sufficient to preclude summary judgment. 
In any event, Mr. Briggs argument on this point continues to ignore his burden of 
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appealing the trial court's finding that he acted in bad faith. It is not enough for Mr. Briggs 
simply to show that there was some material factual dispute that might have been decided in his 
favor. Rather, to challenge the trial court's finding of bad faith, Mr. Briggs '"was required to 
marshal the evidence... [and] demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the trial court, the evidence is insufficient to support the challenged finding." Rohan v. Bosemaau 
46 P.3d 753, 759-760 (Utah App. 2002). 
VIIL THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56 
On pages 36-42 of his brief, Mr. Briggs makes additional arguments that the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment on the Counterclaim under Utah Code Ana § 78-27-56. As 
noted in section VILA, above, however, Mr. Briggs makes no attempt to marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's finding of feet that Mr. Briggs asserted his claims in bad faith. 
On page 37-38 of his brie$ Mr. Briggs cites Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 
1061,1068 (Utah 1991), and Chinman v. Miller. 934 P.2d 1158,1161 (Utah App. 1997), for the 
rule that the trial court "must make specific findings" of each of the elements required by section 
78-27-56. That rule, however, was explicitly rejected in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 
315 (Utah 1998). Moreover, as Mr. Briggs concedes on page 39 of his brie£ the trial court's 
Final Judgment did include specific findings that Mr. Briggs9 "claims are without merit, and were 
not asserted in good faith." (R. 88S.)34 
340n pages 37-40 of his brief, Mr. Briggs seems to argue that the adequacy of the trial 
court's judgment must be judged on the basis of its Minute Entry, and not on the basis of the Final 
Judgment. Mr. Briggs does not cite any basis for such a rule, nor are Mr. Brown and Valley Spa 
aware of any. 
On pages 38-39 of his brief, Mr. Briggs accuses the trial court of bias, and of having 
received an "ex-parte letter" from Mr. Briggs and Valley Spa. The accusation of bias does not 
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On page 40 of his brief, Mr. Briggs cites Cadv v. Johnson 671 P.2d 149,152 (Utah 
1983), for the proposition that a final judgment awarding attorney's fees under section 78-27-56 
must include a "recitation of the 'substantial evidence'" that the losing party's claim was without 
merit. Cadv v. Johnson does not so hold; nor does any other authority knov/n to Mr. Brown and 
Valley Spa. Indeed, such a "recitation" would go beyond the (now rejected) rule ofWatkiss& 
Campbell. 
On pages 40-42 of his brie£ Mr. Briggs correctly cites a number of cases for the 
proposition that "bad faith" is a factual question. However, Mr. Briggs then makes a number of 
factual assertions and argues that, 
Viewing these facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party cannot lead to a finding that Mr. Briggs acted in 
bad faith. 
(Briggs' Br. at 42*) Mr. Briggs has the burden exactly backwards. As held in In re Discipline of 
Sonnenreick 491 Utah Adv. Red. 15 f 45 n. 14 (Utah January 16,2004), to challenge the trial 
court's finding of feet that he acted in bad faith, Mr. Briggs has the burden to "show that the 
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the [district] court, is legally insufficient to support 
the contested finding." Mr. Briggs makes no pretense of such a showing. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES 
UNDER ITS EQUITABLE POWERS 
As noted above, the trial court made its award of attorney's fees on two legal bases: (1) 
Utah's "bad faith" litigation statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56, and (2) the court's inherent 
equitable powers to award attorney's fees where a party has acted in bad faith." (R. at 885.) On 
seem to merit any response. The supposedly "ex-parte letter" was actually sent both to Mr. 
Briggs' counsel and to the court. 
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pages 42 of his brief, Mr. Briggs mischaracterizes the second of these bases. Mr. Briggs 
represents that the trial court "justified its award of fees on the broad claim that it was 'in the 
interests of justice.'" (Briggs' Br. at 42.) In reality, the trial court ruled as follows: 
for the reasons set forth in the Court's Minute Entry dated July 23,2003, as well 
as the grounds set forth in [Mr. Brown and Valley Spa's] memoranda, [Mr. 
Briggs'] claims were without merit, and were not asserted in good faith The 
court further finds that on the undisputed facts of this case, an award of attorneys' 
fees is appropriate in the interests of justice. The court therefore exercises its 
equity powers to award [Mr. Brown and Valley Spa] the attorneys' fees they have 
incurred in this case. 
(R. at 885.) 
On pages 42-44 of his brief, Mr. Briggs asserts that the trial court did not have the power 
to make such an award. However, as this Court stated in Rohan v. Boseman. 46 P.3d 753 (Utah 
App. 2002), "a court has inherent equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it 
deems appropriate in the interest of justice and equity." 46 P.3d at 759. In order to challenge the 
trial court's equitable award, Mr. Briggs had the burden to "marshal the evidence" supporting that 
award, and to 
demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the challenged finding[s]. 
46 P. 3d at 759-760, quoting Wardlev Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon. 21 P.3d 235. Mr. 
Briggs has not met that burden. Mr. Brown and Valley Spa respectfully submit, therefore, that 
the trial court's award of attorney's fees was an appropriate exercise of its equitable powers. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the preceding arguments, Mr. Brown and Valley Spa submit that Mr. Briggs has 
failed to show any reversible error below. Mr. Brown and Valley therefore ask that the judgment 
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of the trial court be affirmed, and that their damages claim against Mr. Briggs be increased to 
include the attorney's fees incurred on this appeal. 
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